4/26/2016, GAO -- The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a recent study on vehcile cybersecurity and the efforts underway to protect drivers from future threats. There following is an excerpt of that study:

What GAO Found

Modern vehicles contain multiple interfaces—connections between the vehicle and external networks—that leave vehicle systems, including safety-critical systems, such as braking and steering, vulnerable to cyberattacks. Researchers have shown that these interfaces—if not properly secured—can be exploited through direct, physical access to a vehicle, as well as remotely through short-range and long-range wireless channels. For example, researchers have shown that attackers could compromise vulnerabilities in the short-range wireless connections to vehicles' Bluetooth units—which enable hands-free cell phone use—to gain access to in-vehicle networks, to take control over safety-critical functions such as the brakes. Among the interfaces that can be exploited through direct access, most stakeholders we spoke with expressed concerns about the statutorily mandated on-board diagnostics port, which provides access to a broad range of vehicle systems for emissions and diagnostic testing purposes. However, the majority of selected industry stakeholders we spoke with (23 out of 32) agreed that wireless attacks, such as those exploiting vulnerabilities in vehicles' built-in cellular-calling capabilities, would pose the largest risk to passenger safety. Such attacks could potentially impact a large number of vehicles and allow an attacker to access targeted vehicles from anywhere in the world. Despite these concerns, some stakeholders pointed out that such attacks remain difficult because of the time and expertise needed to carry them out and thus far have not been reported outside of the research environment.

Key Vehicle Interfaces That Could Be Exploited in a Vehicle Cyberattack

In this context, long-range refers to access at distances over 1 kilometer.

This port is mandated in vehicles by statute for emission-testing purposes and to facilitate diagnostic assessments of vehicles, such as by repair shops. 

Selected industry stakeholders, both in the United States and Europe, informed GAO that a range of key practices is available to identify and mitigate potential vehicle-cybersecurity vulnerabilities. For instance, the majority of selected industry stakeholders we spoke with (22 out of 32) indicated that—to the extent possible—automakers should locate safety-critical systems and non-safety-critical systems on separate in-vehicle networks and limit communication between the two types of systems, a concept referred to as “domain separation.” However, some of these stakeholders also pointed out that complete separation is often not possible or practical because some limited communication will likely need to occur between safety-critical and other vehicle systems. In addition, selected industry stakeholders we spoke to identified technological solutions that can be incorporated into the vehicle to make it more secure. However, according to stakeholders, many of these technologies—such as message encryption and authentication, which can be used to secure and verify the legitimacy of communications occurring along in-vehicle networks—cannot be incorporated into existing vehicles. Rather, such technologies must be incorporated during the vehicle design and production process, which according to stakeholders, takes approximately 5 years to complete.

Read the rest of the study here: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-350?utm_medium=email&utm_source=transportationcommunicationsnewsletter